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Canons of Construction for 
Dysfunctional Statutes: A Comment 
on Bennett 
Paul G. Mahoney* 
I. Introduction 
Shaun Bennett’s Whistling Loud and Clear: Applying Chevron 
to Subsection 21F of Dodd–Frank meticulously analyzes a 
securities law problem of considerable complexity. Bennett wrote 
it after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Digital Realty 
Trust, Inc. v. Somers,1 but before the Court’s decision in the case. 
Just before the Note and this Comment went to press, the Court 
issued its opinion.2 
The Note discusses the so-called “whistleblower” provision of 
Section 922 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act,3 codified as Section 21F of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.4 Paragraph (a) of that provision defines a 
“whistleblower” as someone who provides information relating to 
a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. Paragraph (h) 
provides various protections to whistleblowers, including 
protection against termination of employment. 
The interpretive problem before the Court arose because 
certain employees who reported alleged securities law violations to 
their employers, but not to the SEC, have sought whistleblower 
status and protection against termination under Section 21F. The 
                                                                                                     
 * David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor, University of 
Virginia School of Law. I thank Aditya Bamzai, John Harrison and Julia Mahoney 
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 1. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2017), 
rev’d, No. 16-1276 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2018). 
 2. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, No. 16-1276. (U.S. Feb. 21, 2018). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–50 (2010) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). 
 4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012)). 
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Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits resolved those claims in three 
distinct ways. The Second Circuit deferred to an SEC rule 
extending protection against discharge to employees who report 
securities law violations to their employer, whether or not they 
also report to the SEC.5 The Ninth Circuit did not defer to the 
SEC’s rule but still found that the statute’s protections apply to the 
same broad class of employees.6 The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, took 
the more traditional position that the term, once defined, has the 
defined meaning throughout the relevant statutory provision.7 The 
Court granted certiorari in the Ninth Circuit case to resolve the 
conflict. 
Bennett argues in favor of limiting the statute’s protections to 
employees who report to the SEC, the position that prevailed at 
the Supreme Court. The Note also gives some suggestions to 
Congress should it find the result unpalatable as a matter of policy. 
The Note is analytically sharp but careful, takes a clear position, 
and argues persuasively for it. 
Bennett can take considerable satisfaction from the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Somers, which reached the result for which he 
argued, and for broadly similar reasons. I will accordingly focus my 
commentary on what Somers left unresolved. The opinion took 
pains to declare that there was no conflict between the statutory 
language and statutory purpose.8 This allowed the Court to 
sidestep controversial issues raised in prior cases involving the 
construction of statutory definitions. One is a securities law case, 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co, Inc.9 Another is King v. Burwell,10 which 
the Ninth Circuit concluded gave it authority to rewrite the defined 
term “whistleblower” to reflect a supposedly broader statutory 
purpose. I will suggest that Somers, although it does not explicitly 
engage with either case, requires a slight updating of priors 
regarding the reach and impact of both. 
                                                                                                     
 5. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 6. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050–51, rev’d, No. 16-1276 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2018). 
 7. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 8. See Somers, slip op. at 11 (stating that “Dodd–Frank’s purpose and 
design corroborate our comprehension” of the definitional provision). 
 9. 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
 10. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
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II. Gustafson and the Definition of “Prospectus” 
Somers was not the first case to invite the Court to rewrite an 
explicit definition contained in a securities statute. The Court had 
already done so in Gustafson, producing what knowledgeable 
commentators have called “the worst securities law opinion ever 
written.”11 I will compare the issues before the Court in Gustafson 
and Somers and speculate that the near-universal criticism that 
greeted the former decision influenced the way the Court 
approached the latter. 
With various exceptions and exemptions, the Securities Act of 
1933 requires an issuer making a public offering of securities to 
file a registration statement containing specified information.12 
The statute also limits the ways in which issuers, underwriters, 
and dealers may solicit potential buyers of those securities. At the 
time of the Gustafson decision, the statute limited the written 
solicitations they could provide investors to the information 
contained within the registration statement at the time of the 
solicitation, again with certain exceptions and exemptions. 
As a drafting matter, the statute does this in three separate 
steps (I use the present tense throughout for simplicity, although 
both Congress and the SEC have altered the regulatory scheme in 
various ways since Gustafson). First, Section 2(a)(10) broadly 
defines the term “prospectus” to include any written 
communication “which offers any security for sale”; the term “offer” 
is in turn defined to include any “solicitation.”13 A prospectus is 
therefore any written communication that solicits the purchase of 
a security. 
Next, Section 5(b)(1) makes it illegal, after filing a registration 
statement, to “transmit any prospectus . . . unless such prospectus 
                                                                                                     
 11. Steve Thel, Free Writing, 33 J. CORP. L. 941, 943 (2008); see also Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. 
LAW. 1231, 1231–32 (1995) (calling Gustafson “the most 
poorly-reasoned . . . securities opinion in recent memory”); Edmund W. Kitch, 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: An Opinion that Did Not Write, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 
124. 
 12. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012)). 
 13. Id. § 2(10), 48 Stat. at 75 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) 
(2012)); id. § 2(3), 48 Stat. at 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) 
(2012)). 
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meets the requirements of section 10.”14 In other words, not just 
any written solicitation may be used after filing; the statute 
imposes limits. Finally, Section 10 details what those limits are.15 
In general, a written solicitation must contain the information in 
the registration statement at the time of use in order to be what 
securities lawyers call a “conforming” prospectus, or a prospectus 
that can be used without violating Section 5(b). 
Although divided into these three steps, the scheme is simple 
enough for a student in the first week of a basic securities 
regulation class to grasp. In general, participants in a registered 
offering may not use written soliciting material (prospectuses) 
except for conforming prospectuses, and conforming prospectuses 
are the ones filed as part of the registration statement and 
described in Section 10. 
Gustafson did not involve the registration and prospectus 
requirements, but instead a liability provision. Sections 11 and 12 
of the Securities Act impose civil liability for materially misleading 
statements.16 The former is limited to misstatements contained in 
a registration statement. Section 12(a)(2) imposes civil liability on 
any person who offers or sells a security “by means of a prospectus” 
that contains materially misleading information.17 Unlike 
Section 11, it is not limited on its face to situations in which the 
issuer has filed a registration statement. 
So what does Section 12(a)(2) cover? First, in a registered 
offering, because of differences in the dates as of which the 
registration statement itself and the Section 10 prospectus speak, 
the latter could conceivably contain information in addition to or 
different from the former. Section 12(a)(2) covers any such 
supplemental or corrective information in the Section 10 
prospectus. 
                                                                                                     
 14. Id. § 5(b)(1), 48 Stat. at 77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) 
(2012)). 
 15. Id. § 10, 48 Stat. at 81 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2012)). 
Subsection (a) relates to prospectuses used after the effective date of a 
registration statement, whereas subsection (b) empowers the SEC to allow an 
incomplete prospectus prior to effectiveness. Id. 
 16. Id. §§ 11, 12, 48 Stat. at 82–84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 
77l (2012)). 
 17. Id. § 12(2), 48 Stat. at 84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) 
(2012)). 
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Second, an issuer may sell securities in an exempt transaction, 
most notably a so-called “private placement” exempted under 
Section 4(a)(2).18 Those transactions typically involve the 
preparation of a written selling document called a “private 
placement memorandum.” A private placement memorandum is 
not a Section 10 prospectus and cannot be because there is no 
registration statement. But it is nevertheless a written document 
that solicits the purchase of a security and therefore a “prospectus” 
as defined in Section 2(a)(10). Section 12(a)(2) would therefore 
appear to impose civil liability on an issuer or broker who sells a 
security using a private placement memorandum that contains a 
material misstatement, and before Gustafson the securities bar 
understood it to do so. 
A third situation is more complicated. The principal way the 
Securities Act distinguishes distributions, which must generally be 
registered, from secondary trading, which need not be registered, 
is through another exemption, this one contained in 
Section 4(a)(1).19 The details are unimportant, but a secondary 
market sale described in Section 4(a)(1) need not be registered. 
While run-of-the-mill secondary trades take place on 
impersonal stock exchanges and other markets, buyers and sellers 
sometimes negotiate larger trades face-to-face. A large secondary 
transaction might involve a written stock purchase agreement 
containing company-specific representations, making it look like a 
private placement except that the seller is not the issuer of the 
securities. This was the case in Gustafson, which involved a sale of 
all the stock of a company by its owner. The sale was exempt under 
Section 4(a)(1). 
How, if at all, does Section 12(a)(2) apply to that situation? 
Before Gustafson, there were two principal points of view. One is 
that the plain language of the statute, including the definition of 
“prospectus” to include any written soliciting material, means that 
a disappointed purchaser in a secondary market transaction can 
sue the seller based on misleading factual statements in any 
written documents used to solicit the sale.20 The second view is 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. § 4(1), 48 Stat. at 77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) 
(2012)). 
 19. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012)). 
 20. Pac. Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 583, 594 (7th Cir. 
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that the purpose of the statute is to regulate primary distributions, 
not secondary trading. Imposing civil liability for secondary 
trading is both inconsistent with the statutory purpose and 
unnecessary, because the Securities Exchange Act, which mostly 
regulates secondary markets, has its own civil liability 
provisions.21 Under this view, the term “prospectus” as defined in 
Section 2(a)(10) should be understood to mean any written 
soliciting material used in the context of a primary offering.22 
This was the split before the Court in Gustafson. One expected 
the decision to go in one of two directions: 
The term “prospectus” is defined as “any” written solicitation of 
a securities transaction, without exception. Therefore, section 
12(a)(2) reaches secondary transactions. If that is bad from a 
policy perspective, Congress should fix it. 
Because the principal purpose of the statute is to regulate 
primary transactions, the definition of “prospectus” is implicitly 
limited to any written material used to solicit a primary 
transaction. Therefore, section 12(a)(2) does not reach 
secondary transactions. 
Instead, the Court unexpectedly decided: 
The term “prospectus” means any written solicitation used in a 
public offering. Therefore, § 12(a)(2) does not reach secondary 
transactions. Nor does it reach private placements (which are 
primary offerings but not public offerings). 
The Court’s majority concluded that the key to understanding 
the term “prospectus” is not the definitional Section 2(a)(10), but 
the operational Section 10. In order to avoid conflict between the 
two, the definition of “prospectus” must be limited to a document 
of a type described in Section 10. Because such a document exists 
                                                                                                     
1993). 
 21. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)) (authorizing SEC to regulate “deceptive” 
practices); Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2017) (making it 
unlawful in certain circumstances to “make any untrue statement of a material 
fact”). The federal courts have recognized a private right of action under Rule 
10b-5. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1988) (stating that 
“[j]udicial interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the 
passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists” 
under Rule 10b-5). 
 22. Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
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only in a registered public offering, that limitation must apply to 
the term “prospectus” in Section 12(a)(2). 
Gustafson states: 
Although § 10 does not define what a prospectus is, it does 
instruct us what a prospectus cannot be if the Act is to be 
interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory 
scheme . . . .23 
The case has accordingly come to stand for the proposition that 
statutes must be interpreted as a whole, not piecemeal.24 This is 
ironic, because the Gustafson majority utterly misunderstood the 
overall structure and scheme of the Securities Act. 
The Securities Act is a “coherent regulatory scheme” in which 
Section 5 plays the pivotal role. It and the anti-fraud provision in 
Section 17 impose obligations on sellers of securities. The 
remainder of the statute implements Section 5 by providing 
definitions, exceptions, exemptions, liability and enforcement 
provisions, grants of rulemaking authority, and formulas for 
compliance with Section 5’s prohibitions. Section 10 comes into 
play only when cross-referenced by Section 5(b), and Section 5(b) 
comes into play only when there is a registered public offering. It 
is therefore entirely unsurprising that Section 10 refers only to 
public offerings, and its doing so creates no conflict at all with 
Section 2(a)(10), which is of broader applicability.25 The Court’s 
reading of the statute was little short of bizarre. 
Gustafson was remarkably cavalier about the fact that the 
term “prospectus” was assigned a meaning in a section captioned 
“Definitions.” It gave the definition no priority over other 
provisions of the statute that might bear on what Congress meant. 
Indeed, the analytical portion of the Gustafson opinion opens with 
the words “We begin with § 10,” notwithstanding the fact that the 
issue was the meaning of a term defined in Section 2 of the 
statute.26 The Somers opinion approached the interpretive 
question quite differently. It begins by affirming that “[w]hen a 
                                                                                                     
 23. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995). 
 24. See, e.g., Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States 
ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010) (quoting Gustafson for this proposition). 
 25. My colleague Ed Kitch provided a more detailed version of this argument 
shortly after the Court decided Gustafson. See generally Kitch, supra note 11. 
 26. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568. 
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statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that 
definition, . . . . This principle resolves the question before us.”27 
The Somers Court went on to insist that there is no conflict 
between the language and purpose of Section 21F. Somers does 
not, therefore, explicitly contradict Gustafson. The difference in 
approach is nevertheless striking. One hopes that the Court 
learned its lesson after Gustafson. A generalist court faces a 
daunting task in elucidating the “scheme” of a long, complex 
regulatory statute. It is therefore a bad idea to disregard a 
statutory definition without extremely compelling reasons. This is 
the view that Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Somers, joined by 
Justices Alito and Gorsuch, expresses.28 Because the statutory 
language at issue in Somers is clear, the concurrence argues, any 
resort to the apparent purpose is inappropriate. 
III. Chevron, King, and Somers 
The employee in Somers argued that the Court should defer to 
the SEC’s interpretation of Section 21F’s “whistleblower” 
definition under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. 29 As Bennett carefully describes it, where a 
statute’s meaning is clear, there is no room for the administering 
agency to depart from that plain meaning. It is a predicate to the 
application of so-called Chevron deference that “the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”30 
The argument for finding the definition of “whistleblower” 
ambiguous is that applying its plain meaning would offer 
employees less protection than Congress arguably intended.31 The 
Court did not reach the question whether this asserted policy 
incongruity constitutes “ambiguity” for Chevron purposes because 
it concluded that there was in fact no such incongruity: the 
                                                                                                     
 27. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, No. 16-1276., slip op. at 9 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2018). (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
 28. Id. at 1–2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 29. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). 
 30. Id. at 843. 
 31. See Somers, slip op. at 13–17 (summarizing the employee’s and Solicitor 
General’s arguments in favor of finding the statutory language ambiguous). 
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statute’s purpose was to encourage reporting to the SEC, and thus 
tying protection to reporting furthers the statutory scheme. Does 
the result give us any hint, however, of how the Court might deal 
with similar claims in the future? 
At least one member of the Court appears to reject outright 
the idea that conflict between purported policy goals and statutory 
language is “ambiguity” for Chevron purposes. Concurring in 
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio,32 the Chief Justice argued that 
“[c]ourts defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of an 
ambiguous statute because we presume that Congress intended to 
assign responsibility to resolve the ambiguity to the agency.”33 
Congress sometimes explicitly assigns regulatory responsibility. 
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, for example, gives the 
SEC the authority to define “fraudulent, deceptive, or 
manipulative” devices in connection with tender offers.34 Other 
times, Congress says less than it might have in the expectation 
that the agency can flesh out the details. For ease of explication, I 
will refer to these forms of statutory incompleteness as “Type I 
ambiguity.” In the Chief Justice’s view, Chevron stands for the 
proposition that agencies may resolve Type I ambiguity on a 
delegation theory. 
By contrast, a particular term in a statute may stand in direct 
conflict with another term, with the overall purpose of the statute, 
or with another applicable statutory rule. Congress may have been 
careless in the drafting. Alternatively, it may have intentionally 
failed to resolve a conflict between members’ competing policy 
preferences as expressed in different sections of the statute, 
thereby punting a politically intractable problem to the executive 
branch or the courts. Again, for ease of explication, I will refer to 
these forms of conflict as “Type II ambiguity.” The Scialabba 
concurrence argues that Type II ambiguity is not a reason to defer 
to the agency’s interpretation: “Direct conflict is not ambiguity, 
and the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction 
but legislative choice. Chevron is not a license for an agency to 
repair a statute that does not make sense.”35 This implies that 
                                                                                                     
 32. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). 
 33. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012). 
 35. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
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when a statute “doesn’t make sense,” that is, when it contains Type 
II ambiguity, it is for the court, not an agency, to decide what to do 
about it.36 
King v. Burwell accordingly posed a doctrinal challenge for the 
Chief Justice. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act37 
(ACA) provides certain tax credits to taxpayers purchasing 
insurance through “an Exchange established by the State.”38 The 
question before the Court was whether the tax credits are also 
available to purchasers on an exchange established by the federal 
government. The Internal Revenue Service concluded that they 
are.39 Moreover, it would be difficult to accomplish the goals the 
President and the Congressional leadership set for ACA if the 
subsidies were available in fewer than half of the states. This 
conflict between statutory language and Congress’s presumed 
intent—and not the IRS’s position—was the practical motivation 
for concluding that the phrase “established by the State” actually 
means “established by the State or the federal government.” 
This was an instance of Type II ambiguity—the words of the 
statute conflicted with the aims that the statute’s supporters 
claimed for it. As such, the Chief Justice viewed it as an 
inappropriate issue to delegate to the IRS. However, his Scialabba 
concurrence did not command a majority and he did not invoke it 
in King. Instead, his majority there cited Food and Drug 
Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.40 for the 
narrower proposition that, “in extraordinary cases,” ambiguity 
does not equal delegation to an agency.41 Extraordinary cases are 
                                                                                                     
 36. The Court recently denied a petition for certiorari expressly raising the 
question, whether direct conflict between two statutory provisions is “ambiguity” 
for purposes of Chevron. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Perez-Guzman 
v. Sessions, No. 17-302 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2017) (“This Court should grant review to 
clarify whether Chevron applies to unambiguous but conflicting statutes.”), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 737 (2018). The lower court’s decision is reported at 
Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 18001 (2010)). 
 38. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A). 
 39. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(a)(1) (2017) (extending tax credit to certain 
persons enrolled in health plans “through an Exchange”); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 
(defining “Exchange” to include those “operated by a State . . . or by HHS”). 
 40. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 41. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (citation omitted). 
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those in which the ambiguity goes to a major, rather than an 
interstitial, policy question. The Chief Justice explained that King 
was such an extraordinary case: “Whether those credits are 
available on Federal Exchanges is . . . central to this statutory 
scheme.”42 Having therefore concluded that the conflict between 
ACA’s clear statutory language and apparent purpose was not a 
license for an agency to repair it, the Court concluded that it was 
nevertheless a license for the Court to repair it. 
The Ninth Circuit relied on King in rewriting Dodd–Frank’s 
“whistleblower” definition itself while not deferring to the SEC’s 
rewrite.43 As Bennett argues, however, Somers differs from King 
in that it does not involve a major policy question. The availability 
of whistleblower protection to an employee who reports only 
internally is not as important to the overall scheme of the Dodd–
Frank Act as the availability of subsidies on federal exchanges is 
to ACA. This suggests that there was no extraordinary 
circumstance in Somers to preclude an ordinary application of 
Chevron. The Court’s conclusion that the statutory language was 
consistent with the statutory purpose meant that there was no 
ambiguity for the SEC to resolve, so its regulatory rewrite of the 
statutory language could not stand. 
The unresolved question after Somers, then, is how a majority 
of the Court will approach future cases involving Type II 
ambiguity. King appeared to signal that the federal courts have 
broad latitude to rewrite ill-conceived statutory language that fails 
to advance the purposes the statute’s proponents identified for it. 
Justice Scalia’s King dissent, on the other hand, suggests that the 
decision was an anomaly driven by the Court’s desire not to 
interfere with ACA.44 Justice Thomas’s Somers concurrence takes 
the position that Type II ambiguity is insufficient to give either the 
administering agency or the courts license to “fix” a statute. 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 2489. 
 43. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 44. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But normal rules of 
interpretation seem always to yield to the overriding principle of the present 
Court: The Affordable Care Act must be saved.”). 
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IV. How Do You Construe a Dysfunctional Statute? 
This unresolved question is important because, as Somers 
illustrates, the Court is likely to confront more and more cases 
asking whether the word “blue” actually means “orange.” We 
should discuss the elephant in the room: Congress no longer 
legislates carefully, and what it produces is often an incoherent 
mess. 
Consider the present controversy. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
200245 (SOX) gives a right of action to employees of publicly traded 
companies who allege discharge or other discrimination because of 
certain whistleblower activities. The plaintiff must seek relief from 
the Secretary of Labor before filing suit. There is a ninety-day 
statute of limitations. A successful plaintiff may recover 
compensatory damages. 
The Dodd–Frank Act gives a right of action to employees, not 
limited to those of publicly traded companies, who allege discharge 
or other discrimination because of similar whistleblower activities. 
The employee may file suit without first seeking administrative 
relief. The statute of limitations is substantially longer than ninety 
days. The available damages are greater than compensatory. 
Dodd–Frank accompanies these whistleblower protections with a 
bounty system that affirmatively encourages whistleblowing. 
What explains this combination of provisions? If Congress 
intended to make SOX’s whistleblower protection more robust, 
why didn’t it simply amend or replace the SOX provision? If, as the 
Court suggested, it simply intended to encourage employees to 
report securities law violations to the SEC, why didn’t it just add 
a bounty provision rather than including protections against 
discharge that largely overlap those in SOX?46 
The simple answer is we don’t know. It is also clear that we 
cannot infer much from what Congress did or didn’t do to 
harmonize the Dodd–Frank and SOX provisions. The legislative 
                                                                                                     
 45. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)). 
 46. Note that Congress did not include the same overlapping provision in the 
nearly identical whistleblower provisions that Dodd–Frank adds to the 
Commodity Exchange Act. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (codified 
at 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012)). 
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process that produced Dodd–Frank was not the one described in 
high school civics textbooks.47 There are many possible 
explanations for Congress’s inability in recent years to use “the 
traditional legislative process”:48 the partisanship of our era, the 
members’ need to engage in constant fundraising, or the tendency 
to outsource legislative drafting to lobbyists and think tanks, 
among others. Whatever the cause, the effect is the same. Major 
legislation is generally overstuffed, poorly organized, and 
internally inconsistent, not to mention inconsistent with other 
statutory provisions on related issues. 
Without saying so explicitly, the federal courts are developing 
canons of construction for dysfunctional statutes. The King opinion 
nearly says as much. It excuses the sloppiness of the statute by 
describing the unprecedented process of its enactment, before 
concluding that it is the Court’s job to drag ACA across the finish 
line.49 The Court will eventually have to give better guidance to 
lower courts faced with conflicts between what high-profile 
statutes actually say and what Congress believes they say. 
In his reminiscences on the Securities Act of 1933,50 James 
Landis, who left his position as a professor of legislation at 
Harvard Law School to lead the White House team shepherding 
the statute through Congress, described his meetings with 
Middleton Beaman, a career staffer in charge of legislative 
drafting in the House of Representatives: 
I had thought I knew something of legislative draftsmanship 
until I met him. The next days were spent in continuous 
conference with him and [his assistant]. For days Beaman 
                                                                                                     
 47. See generally ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA’S 
ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN’T (2014) (describing the 
enactment of Dodd–Frank). 
 48. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (quoting John Cannan, A 
Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative Procedure Shapes 
Legislative History, 105 L. LIBR. J. 131, 163 (2013)). 
 49. Id. at 2496. The Court could not bring itself to acknowledge that the very 
clause of the statute at issue in King was missing a word. The Court quotes the 
statute as providing subsidies to persons acquiring insurance from “an Exchange 
established by the State under section 1311 of [ACA]”. Id. at 2487 (emphasis in 
original). In fact, the text as enacted by Congress omitted the word “section”; it 
says, “an Exchange established by the State under 1311 of [ACA].” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 50. Pub. L. No 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. 
590 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577 (2018) 
would not allow us to draft a line. He insisted instead on 
exploring the implications of the bill to find exactly what we had 
or did not have in mind.51 
The resulting statute occupies a svelte twenty-two pages in the 
Statutes at Large.52 Beaman and his staff worked on it during a 
profound national emergency, while Congress was simultaneously 
considering statutes comprehensively regulating banking and 
agriculture.53 Whatever their other demerits, those statutes are 
well-crafted legal documents. 
No one lavished the same care on ACA or Dodd–Frank. The 
King opinion, however, thrust the Court into Beaman’s 
institutional role. The Court decided that it understood precisely 
what Congress and the Executive actually wanted to achieve and 
cleaned up the language that Congress enacted accordingly. 
The Somers opinion suggests that the Court’s editorial 
assistance will be available only in rare circumstances. As such, it 
supports Justice Scalia’s essentially political understanding of the 
King result. ACA was President Obama’s signature legislative 
accomplishment and its repeal was the central promise of many 
Republican congressional and presidential campaigns. The Chief 
Justice, rightly or wrongly, appears to have believed that the Court 
would be accused of taking sides politically if it applied the statute 
Congress wrote rather than the one the President described to the 
public. An obscure provision of Dodd–Frank did not receive the 
same concierge-level treatment. 
In my view, this is all to the good. The Court should refuse to 
play along when Congress cannot enact legislative language 
sufficient to achieve what it wants. Deprived of the luxury of 
knowing that the Court will bail it out when necessary, Congress 
would have an incentive to resume paying attention to the 
language of the statutes it enacts. 
Had the Court, in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius,54 decided that the word “penalty” does not 
                                                                                                     
 51. James M. Landis, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 37 (1959). 
 52. Securities Act §§ 1–41, 48 Stat. at 74–95 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa95). 
 53. See generally Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 
Stat. 31; Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162. 
 54. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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mean “tax” merely because it is convenient for it to do so, ACA’s 
individual mandate would not have survived. The statute might 
then have collapsed without the Court having to engage in the even 
greater interpretive gymnastics of King. Congress would have 
learned an important and valuable lesson: the process that 
produced ACA is no way to enact a statute that restructures one of 
the nation’s largest industries and creates enormous uncertainty 
about cost and access to health care providers for millions of 
households. 
Perhaps, then, Justice Scalia was right. Somers may signal 
that traditional rules of statutory construction apply apart from 
ACA. The Court did precisely what Bennett suggested and 
declined to rewrite Section 21F of the Exchange Act, a statute that 
is clear on its face, even if it is not the statute the 111th Congress 
wishes it had enacted. If the Court refuses to enable dysfunction, 
we may see less of it. 
